Taxation and incentives to innovate: a principal-agent approach
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- Diego d'Andria, 2016. "Taxation and Incentives to Innovate: A Principal-Agent Approach," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 72(1), pages 96-123, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordstax incentives for R&D; patent box; principal-agent models; multitasking models; profit sharing schemes; incentives to innovate;
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2014-12-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2014-12-08 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-INO-2014-12-08 (Innovation)
- NEP-PBE-2014-12-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2014-12-08 (Public Finance)
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