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Welfare, Corruption, and the Economic Vote of Punishment: The Turkish Case

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  • Hazama,Yasushi

Abstract

Do social security and corruption control buffer electoral punishment for poor economic conditions? Previous studies have shown that both generous social security and corruption control mitigate the impact of economic conditions on incumbent votes. However, whether these two noneconomic issues lessen punishment or reward behaviours or both is unclear. Using a dataset from a 2018 post-election survey in Turkey, this study shows that social security weakens reward behaviour but not punishment behaviour, whereas corruption control weakens punishment behaviour but not reward behaviour. When economic grievances dominate public opinion, corruption control is more critical for incumbent support than social security provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Hazama,Yasushi, 2023. "Welfare, Corruption, and the Economic Vote of Punishment: The Turkish Case," IDE Discussion Papers 908, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    • Handle: RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper908
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    File URL: https://ir.ide.go.jp/record/2000107/files/IDP000908_001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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