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Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Author

Listed:
  • Hazama, Yasushi

Abstract

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Hazama, Yasushi, 2012. "Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey," IDE Discussion Papers 340, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
  • Handle: RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper340
    as

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    File URL: https://ir.ide.go.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=37834&item_no=1&attribute_id=22&file_no=1
    File Function: First version, 2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ali Akarca & Aysit Tansel, 2006. "Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 77-105, October.
    2. Yogesh Uppal, 2009. "The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 9-27, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internal politics; Elections; Political parties; Economic conditions; Turkey; Economic voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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