Horizontal Mergers For Buyer Power
Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of merging firms in input markets.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2003|
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- Stephane Caprice, 2005. "Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(9), pages 1-5.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:9:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-227, March.
- Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 1997. "On merger profitability in a Cournot setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-79, January.
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