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Privatización y fusiones en oligopolios mixtos

  • José Méndez Naya

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    Partiendo de un modelo de oligopolio mixto en el que las empresas compiten a la Cournot, el objetivo de este trabajo es el de complementar la literatura existente sobre las fusiones horizontales de empresas. En concreto, se matiza la paradoja de las fusiones al probar que ciertas fusiones pueden ser beneficiosas para las empresas fusionadas, aunque no incluyan a la mayor parte de las empresas del mercado. Por otro lado, se demuestra que para que una fusión sea beneficiosa desde el punto de vista del bienestar es necesario que el grado de privatización de la empresa pública sea relativamente bajo.

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    File URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/0c40badf-4703-4caf-8550-c6c52bd12d3a.pdf
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    Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.

    Volume (Year): 34 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 Year 2007 (June)
    Pages: 37-52

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    Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:34:y:2007:i:1:p:37-52
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    1. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2001. "Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure," Discussion Papers, various Research Units FS IV 01-05, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
    3. Anthony Creane & Carl Davidson, 2004. "Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(4), pages 951-977, November.
    4. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
    5. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-43, August.
    6. Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Garzón San Felipe, María Begoña, 2000. "Mixed Duopoly, Merger and Multiproduct Firms," BILTOKI 2000-10, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística).
    7. Ramón Faulí-Oller, 1997. "On merger profitability in a cournot setting," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    8. Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 1997. "On merger profitability in a Cournot setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-79, January.
    9. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
    10. Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 2002. "Mergers between Asymmetric Firms: Profitability and Welfare," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(1), pages 77-87, January.
    11. Lorenz NETT, 1993. "Mixed Oligopoly With Homogeneous Goods," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 367-393, 07.
    12. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
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