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- Duopoly Price Communication

Author

Listed:
  • José J. Sempere Monerris

    (Universitat de València)

  • Amparo Urbano

    (Universitat de València)

  • María Dolores Alepuz

    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

We investigate the role of price communication in imperfect information environments by setting up a dynamic differentiated duopoly where actions are not observable and where firms decide, before pricing, whether to communicate their choices to the rivals. When firms play simultaneously in the pricing stages, communication across them is a dominant strategy allowing firms to coordinate prices, thus reducing competition. However, when communication takes place within pricing stages, this meaning that firms are given the opportunity to choose roles, the above firms coordination in prices is mitigated. This is because of the existence of a second mover advantage effect. Communication by the leader acts as a pre-commitment device to a price umbrella that the follower will undercut. As a result, we end up with a more competitive situation although price levels will not go down to those without communication.

Suggested Citation

  • José J. Sempere Monerris & Amparo Urbano & María Dolores Alepuz, 1998. "- Duopoly Price Communication," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-26
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1998-26.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    commitment; price communication;

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