Stackelberg vs. Cournot / Bertrand Equilibrium
We consider the issue of endogenous timing, according to the extended game of Hamilton-Sluytsky (1990), for the classical Coumot and Bertrand duopolies. We provide minimal sufficient conditions, directly on the primitives of each model (i.e. the demand and cost functions), yielding the simultaneous and two sequential modes of play. No superfluous assumptions of concavity, existence and uniqueness of equilibria... are needed, and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games.
|Date of creation:||01 May 1994|
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