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Competition and Commitment: the Supply and Enforcement of Rights to Improve Roads and Rivers in England, 1600-1750

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  • Dan Bogart

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

Prominent theories link political changes in seventeenth century England with greater security of property rights and less regulation. This paper informs these theories by studying the supply and enforcement of monopoly rights to improve roads and rivers between 1600 and 1750. The evidence shows that the King, Commons, and Lords all supplied improvement rights before the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Afterwards the Commons gained a monopoly over the initiation of rights and became increasingly effective. Lastly the evidence shows that Parliament and the King voided or diminished improvement rights, but such instances were less frequent and less arbitrary after 1688.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Bogart, 2008. "Competition and Commitment: the Supply and Enforcement of Rights to Improve Roads and Rivers in England, 1600-1750," Working Papers 070817, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:070817
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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2007-08/bogart-17.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; Commitment; Competition; Infrastructure Investment; Pre-Industrial England;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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