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Le Plan De Sauvetage De Chypre : Frein Ou Accelerateur Du Risque Systemique En Europe ?

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  • Jean Messiha
  • Frédéric Teulon

Abstract

The European institutions have failed on the Cyprus issue, the opportunity to establish their credibility with it. Not only they have not benefited from the modesty of the Cyprus problem to show how they could prevent systemic risks grow in the euro area, but they additionally led an action proved pro-cyclical. Thus, faced with the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus, Europe, together with the IMF presented a first bailout, one action - the taxation of all deposits - has resulted aggravate the crisis she wanted to fight. A new plan was made more balanced by the Eurogroup on 25 March 2013. The partial taxation of deposits and the adoption of exchange controls drastically violate the pact of trust that binds far investors and their banks. Cyprus has been under de facto economic tutelage.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Messiha & Frédéric Teulon, 2015. "Le Plan De Sauvetage De Chypre : Frein Ou Accelerateur Du Risque Systemique En Europe ?," Working Papers 2015-615, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2015-615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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