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Inflation Surges and Monetary Policy

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  • Carl E. Walsh

    (Distinguished Professor Economics Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, and Honorary Adviser to the IMES (E-mail: walshc@ucsc.edu).)

Abstract

Similarities between the 1960s and 1970s raise concerns that central banks are repeating mistakes that led to the Great Inflation. Two explanations for this earlier period of inflation, that it was due to shocks and special factors or that it was the result of political pressures on monetary policy, seem particularly relevant today. Major central banks such as the Federal Reserve and the ECB have been slow to react to the surge in inflation due to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. I investigate the consequences of policy delay and the impact of a more aggressive reaction, conditional on policy being delayed. In assessing the persistence of inflation shocks and in dealing with uncertainty about inflation dynamics, policymakers seem to be ignoring lessons from the literature on monetary policy in the face of model uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Carl E. Walsh, 2022. "Inflation Surges and Monetary Policy," IMES Discussion Paper Series 22-E-12, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:22-e-12
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    File URL: https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/22-E-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Takuji Fueki & Yutaka Soejima & Shunichi Yoneyama, 2022. "New Dimensions and Frontiers in Central Banking Summary of the 2022 BOJ-IMES Conference," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 40, pages 1-20, November.
    2. James B. Bullard, 2022. "Reflections on the Disinflationary Methods of Poincaré and Thatcher," Speech 94556, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    3. Athanasios Orphanides, 2023. "The Forward Guidance Trap," IMES Discussion Paper Series 23-E-06, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    4. Takuji Fueki & Yutaka Soejima & Shunichi Yoneyama, 2022. "New Dimensions and Frontiers in Central Banking Summary of the 2022 BOJ-IMES Conference," IMES Discussion Paper Series 22-E-13, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation; Monetary policy; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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