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Gobierno Corporativo en América Latina

  • Alberto Chong

    ()

  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes

Este documento analiza las recientes tendencias del desarrollo institucional de América Latina en relación a la protección del inversionista. A pesar del subdesarrollo de los mercados financieros de la región, hay un movimiento lento hacia reformas legales con la intención de proteger a los inversionistas y hacer que los mercados regionales sean más atractivos para ellos; deficiencias actuales en las instituciones legales de la región generan altos niveles de concentración de propiedad, escaso acceso a financiamiento de capital extranjero y mercado de capital poco activo. La evidencia en este trabajo, basada en la información a nivel de empresa en seis países, muestra que asi como la protección legal para inversionistas, el gobierno corporativo a nivel de empresas está vinculado a disminuir los gastos de capital, mejor valuación, ejecución, y pagos de dividendos. Las firmas pueden compensar por las deficiencias legales de sus países, distinguiéndose a través del mejoramiento de prácticas de gobierno corporativo, asímismo aumentando la transparencia y limitando un potencial conflicto entre los grandes y pequeños accionistas. Adicionalmente, las empresas pueden buscar capital emitiendo ADR`s como lo han hecho en años recientes, aunque esta práctica debilita los mercados locales de capital. Al final, las firmas y los reguladores deben mejorar su estructura de gobierno y protección a los accionistas si quieren alcanzar los estandares mejorados de los países desarrollados,ocasionados por los recientes escándalos en Asia, Europa y Estados Unidos.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4495.

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Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4495
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