Exclusion in the All-Pay Auction: An Experimental Investigation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1407-1418, September.
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Keywordsexperiments; contests; all-pay auction; heterogeneity; regret aversion;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2011-02-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-26 (Game Theory)
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