Cross-Shareholdings, Outside Directors, and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Japan
We have analyzed the monitoring role of outside directors in Japan. A detailed classification of each outside director into (1)former bankers; (2)former shareholders; (3)former cross-shareholders; and(4)pure outside directors reveals that only pure outside directors increase the turnover-performance sensitivity of inside directors. That is, we found that the background of each outside director is crucial for his or her role as a monitor.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2004|
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