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Employment policy and corporate governance-- An empirical comparison of the stakeholder and the profit-maximization model

Listed author(s):
  • Abe, Naohito
  • Shimizutani, Satoshi

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147-5967(07)00015-7
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 346-368

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:35:y:2007:i:2:p:346-368
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

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  1. Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October.
  2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
  3. Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1993. "Job Security and Work Force Adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers,in: Christopher F. Buechtemann (ed.), Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior: Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence, pages 180-199 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  4. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
  5. Genda, Yuji & Rebick, Marcus E, 2000. "Japanese Labour in the 1990s: Stability and Stagnation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 85-102, Summer.
  6. Faleye, Olubunmi & Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall, 2006. "When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(03), pages 489-510, September.
  7. Weinstein, David E & Yafeh, Yishay, 1995. "Japan's Corporate Groups: Collusion or Competitive? An Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 359-376, December.
  8. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
  9. Nickell, S J & Andrews, M, 1983. "Unions, Real Wages and Employment in Britain 1951-79," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(0), pages 183-206, Supplemen.
  10. Sheard Paul, 1994. "Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring in the Japanese Main Bank System," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-21, March.
  11. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
  12. Randall Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Chapters,in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 1-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
  14. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
  15. M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, April.
  16. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
  17. Kang, Jun-Koo & Shivdasani, Anil, 1997. "Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 29-65, October.
  18. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
  19. Assar Lindbeck, 1993. "Unemployment and Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121751, January.
  20. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, February.
  21. Enrico Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Control," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-102/2, Tinbergen Institute.
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