Strategic tax and public service competition among local governments
Tax and public service competition between local governments concerning localisation of new residents is analysed in a setting of economic spillovers which means that also a neighbouring region will benefit from localisation via demand of residents in a border region, (a so-called host region). We identify two basic Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the analysed tax-game. In one of these outcomes local tax rates will be different across the regions – a fact that appears important for (future) empirical studies of local tax competition. Due to the lack of adequate theoretical modelling, studies in this field have often demonstrated spatial dependence of local policy variables without identifying the source of interaction between decision-makers. Our theoretical findings prove to be robust to a range of important expansions of the basic simple framework.
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