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Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system

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Abstract

When a monopolistic hydro producer interacts with a competitive thermal fringe, the short-run revenue function of the hydro monopolist is non-concave. This implies that even if the demand function is stationary, equilibrium prices may fluctuate through the year. For given capacities, both hydro and thermal producers are better off under such an outcome than under the competitive outcome with constant prices, while consumers are worse off. Prices may fluctuate through the year also in the long-run equilibrium where capacities are endogenous. In such an equilibrium the hydropower monopoly will get a lower profit than it would have gotten had it been a price taker.

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  • Hoel, Michael, 2004. "Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system," Memorandum 28/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2004_028
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    File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2004/Memo-28-2004.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Russell Pittman & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, 2010. "Electricity Restructuring In China: How Competitive Will Generation Markets Be?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 55(02), pages 377-400.
    2. Russell Pittman & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, 2008. "Electricity Restructuring in China: The Elusive Quest for Competition," EAG Discussions Papers 200805, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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