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Will Cross-Ownership Reestablish Market Power in the Nordic Power Market?

Author

Listed:
  • Amundsen, E.S.
  • Bergman, L.

Abstract

The integration of the power markets in Norway and Sweden in 1996 significantly constrained the major power companies' ability to exercise market power within their national borders. In recent years, however margers and reciprocal acquisition of shares have reduced the number of independent players on the Norwegian-Swedish power market.

Suggested Citation

  • Amundsen, E.S. & Bergman, L., 2000. "Will Cross-Ownership Reestablish Market Power in the Nordic Power Market?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1900, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1900
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
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    10. repec:bla:joares:v:25:y:1987:i::p:1-21 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. C. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2007. "The Potential for Electricity Market Restructuring in Quebec," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Wietze Lise & Claudia Kemfert & Richard S.J. Tol, 2003. "Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity Market," Working Papers 2003.3, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Hoel, Michael, 2004. "Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system," Memorandum 28/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ELECTRICITY ; MARKET ; BEHAVIOUR;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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