Visits to the Client when Tendering for Consulting Contracts: Sourcing Information or Influencing the Client?
Consulting firms (CFs) sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts. One frequently used strategy by CFs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders. The reason to the visits is either: 1) to influence the client in his decision-making in some sense; or 2) to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted. Using a unique database on individual proposals, I examine empirically which of these two reasons is the most important. The estimations suggest that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits.
|Date of creation:||10 Mar 2000|
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- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
- repec:hhs:iuiwop:508 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
- Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
- Svensson, Roger, 1998. "Exporting Consultancy Services in the Infrastructure Sectors: The Determinants of Obtaining Assignments," Working Paper Series 508, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
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