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Visits to the Client when Tendering for Consulting Contracts: Sourcing Information or Influencing the Client?

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Abstract

Consulting firms (CFs) sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts. One frequently used strategy by CFs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders. The reason to the visits is either: 1) to influence the client in his decision-making in some sense; or 2) to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted. Using a unique database on individual proposals, I examine empirically which of these two reasons is the most important. The estimations suggest that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits.

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  • Svensson, Roger, 2000. "Visits to the Client when Tendering for Consulting Contracts: Sourcing Information or Influencing the Client?," Working Paper Series 531, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0531
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consulting services; Procurement; Visits; Information sourcing; Lobbying; Marketing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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