On Refunding of Emission Taxes and Technology Diffusion
We analyze diffusion of an abatement technology in an imperfectly competitive industry under a standard emission tax compared to an emission tax which is refunded in proportion to output market share. The results indicate that refunding can speed up diffusion if firms do not strategically influence the size of the refund. If they do, it is ambiguous whether diffusion is slower or faster than under a non-refunded emission tax. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether refunding continues over time to provide larger incentives for technological upgrading than a non-refunded emission tax, since the effects of refunding dissipate as the overall industry becomes cleaner.
|Date of creation:||09 Oct 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden|
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