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Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan Engelhardt

    (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

  • David L. Fuller

    (Concordia University)

Abstract

A fixed wage is inefficient in a standard search model when workers endogenously separate from employment. We derive an efficient employment contract that involves agents paying a hiring fee (or bond) upon the formation of a match. We estimate the fixed wage and efficient contract assuming the hiring fee is unobservable, and find evidence to reject the efficient contract in favor of the fixed wage rule. A counterfactual experiment reveals the current level of labor force participation to be 9% below the efficient level, and a structural shift to the efficient contract improves welfare by nearly 4%.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Engelhardt & David L. Fuller, 2009. "Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 0909, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0909
    as

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    File URL: https://hcapps.holycross.edu/hcs/RePEc/hcx/HC0909-Engelhardt-Fuller_LaborSearch.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, November 2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Fuller, David L., 2014. "Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 108-122.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    labor supply; unemployment; matching; efficiency wages;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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