IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-02379941.html

Voter Autrement 2017 for the French Presidential Election

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Bouveret

  • Renaud Blanch

  • Antoinette Baujard

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • François Durand

  • Herrade Igersheim

  • Jérôme Lang

  • Annick Laruelle

  • Jean-François Laslier

  • Isabelle Lebon

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Vincent Merlin

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In April 2017, during the first round of the French presidential election, we performed a set of experiments on the use of voting rules. Participants to these experiments were asked to test several alternative voting methods, like approval voting, and other variants of evaluative voting. The experiments were both carried out in situ in polling stations during the first round of the presidential election (using paper ballots), and on line during the month preceding the first round, and until the second round of the election (using a web application). A total of 6358 participants took part to the in situ experiment and 37739 participants took part to the on line experiment. This paper describes the protocol of the in situ experiments and the format of the collected dataset.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Bouveret & Renaud Blanch & Antoinette Baujard & François Durand & Herrade Igersheim & Jérôme Lang & Annick Laruelle & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon & Vincent Merlin, 2019. "Voter Autrement 2017 for the French Presidential Election," Working Papers halshs-02379941, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02379941
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02379941v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02379941v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2019. "Voter autrement," Post-Print halshs-02875322, HAL.
    2. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2025. "Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval Voting," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 65-86, November.
    2. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2022. "Not-so-strategic Voters," Working Papers 2201, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2022. "Not-so-strategic voters.Evidence from an in situ experiment during the 2017 French presidential election," Post-Print halshs-03607824, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    2. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
    3. Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 57-76, August.
    4. Tanguiane, Andranick S., 2022. "Analysis of the 2021 Bundestag elections. 4/4. The third vote application," Working Paper Series in Economics 154, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    5. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers hal-00914887, HAL.
    6. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2014. "Satisfaction Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Rudolf Fara & Dennis Leech & Maurice Salles (ed.), Voting Power and Procedures, edition 127, pages 323-346, Springer.
    7. François Maniquet & Philippe Mongin, 2015. "Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 519-532, March.
    8. Aaron Hamlin & Whitney Hua, 2023. "The case for approval voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 335-345, September.
    9. Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
    10. Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
    11. Arnold Cédrick SOH VOUTSA, 2020. "Approval Voting & Majority Judgment in Weighted Representative Democracy," Thema Working Papers 2020-15, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    12. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
    13. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George, 2022. "The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 283-300, February.
    15. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    16. Pietro Battiston & Marco Magnani & Dimitri Paolini & Luca Rossi, 2025. "Country Music: Positional Voting and Strategic Behavior," Discussion Papers 2025/322, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    17. Hans Gersbach, 2024. "Forms of new democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(4), pages 799-837, June.
    18. Andranik Tangian, 2021. "MCDM Application of the Third Vote," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 775-787, August.
    19. Martínez, Ricardo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2017. "Qualified voting systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 49-54.
    20. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Working Papers hal-02196387, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02379941. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.