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Collaborateurs, emplois familiaux et niveau d'activité des parlementaires français

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  • Benjamin Monnery

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon)

Abstract

This article takes advantage of the recent release, following the "Fillon scandal", of a list of all assistants employed by the 920 current parliamentarians in France, to quantify family employment by deputies and senators. By linking this information with demographic and political characteristics, we give a portray of parliamentarians who employ family members. Finally, after merging these statistics to publicly-available data on officials' observable activity in the Parliament during the last 12 months, we show that parliamentarians who employ family members as assistants are significantly less present, less active and less productive in the Assembly and in the Senate compared to others, all else equal. This result either suggests that employing a family member (instead of other assistants) reduces activity in the Parliament (causal effect), or that those who use family jobs are also relatively low-activity parliamentarians (selection effect). Instrumental variable regressions tend to favor the second hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Monnery, 2017. "Collaborateurs, emplois familiaux et niveau d'activité des parlementaires français," Working Papers halshs-01538005, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01538005
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01538005
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; rent-extraction; nepotism; Parliament; Economie politique; extraction de rente; népotisme; Parlement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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