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Central bank communication during normal and crisis time

Author

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  • Christophe Blot

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Paul Hubert

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Central banks have intensified their communication strategy since the mid 1990's and it has become an important instrument of central banks' policymaking toolkit. A large empirical evidence suggests that central bank communication has effectively enhanced the transmission of monetary policy before and during the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the use of communication as a policy instrument is fragile since it depends on economic agents' perceptions and beliefs. It is crucial that central bank communication be consistent with policy decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Blot & Paul Hubert, 2018. "Central bank communication during normal and crisis time," Working Papers hal-03404315, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03404315
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03404315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo N. Ferreira, 2021. "Forecasting with VAR-teXt and DFM-teXt Models:exploring the predictive power of central bank communication," Working Papers Series 559, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.

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