IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-01659176.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regional Purchasing Groups and Hospital Medicine Prices: Evidence from Group Creations

Author

Listed:
  • Léa Toulemon

    () (Hospinnomics (PSE - AP-HP), PSE - Paris School of Economics, Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris - Assistance publique - Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP))

Abstract

This paper estimates the impact of group purchasing on medicine prices in French hospitals, taking advantage of the entry of hospitals into regional purchasing groups between 2009 and 2014. This paper uses a new database providing the average annual prices paid for all innovative and costly medicines in public hospitals. Using a fixed effects model that controls for hospitals' medicine-specific bargaining abilities and medicine-specific price trends, I find that group purchasing reduces prices of medicines in oligopoly markets, but has no impact on the prices of medicines with no competitors.

Suggested Citation

  • Léa Toulemon, 2017. "Regional Purchasing Groups and Hospital Medicine Prices: Evidence from Group Creations," Working Papers hal-01659176, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01659176
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01659176
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01659176/document
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth S. Corts, 1998. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 306-323, Summer.
    2. Albane Degrassat-Théas & M. Bensadon & C. Rieu & M. Angalakuditi & C. Pen & P. Paubel, 2012. "Hospital Reimbursement Price Cap for Cancer Drugs," PharmacoEconomics, Springer, vol. 30(7), pages 565-573, July.
    3. Matthew Grennan, 2014. "Bargaining Ability and Competitive Advantage: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 3011-3025, December.
    4. Matthew Grennan, 2013. "Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 145-177, February.
    5. Varian, Hal R., 1989. "Price discrimination," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 597-654 Elsevier.
    6. Sorenson, Corinna & Kanavos, Panos, 2011. "Medical technology procurement in Europe: A cross-country comparison of current practice and policy," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 43-50, April.
    7. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    hospital medicine prices; purchasing groups; bargaining ability;

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01659176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.