How proper is the dominance-solvable outcome?
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- Bo Chen & Rajat Deb, 2018. "The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 381-414, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Proper equilibrium; Weak dominance; Iterated elimination; Proper equilibrium.;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2015-08-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2015-08-19 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2015-08-19 (Microeconomics)
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