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Evolution de la gouvernance des entreprises et impact sur la visibilité boursière en période de crise

  • Bernard Olivero

    ()

    (CRIFP - Centre de Recherche en Ingénierie financière et finance Publique - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)

  • Hanene Ezzine

    (CRIFP - Centre de Recherche en Ingénierie financière et finance Publique - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis, FSEG - University of Sfax, Tunisia)

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    The passage from the financial sphere to the real sphere during the economic crises results in a domino effect which accelerates the spread of crises. Some companies, however, show better resistance than others thereby limiting the spread, and the effectiveness of governance mechanisms is often put forward as an explanation of the phenomenon. In the 2006-2008 pre and crisis period, we observe significant changes in scores representative of corporate governance. We find that most firms show a fairly satisfactory level of compliance with OECD governance principles. The firm ability to resist the Asian stock market crisis is assessed by minimization of financial return's conditional volatility estimated by ARCH and GARCH models. The links between governance scores and financial return's conditional volatility are observed. Good governance practices, hired to improve shareholders confidence so the visibility of firm by the market during crisis period.

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    Date of creation: 01 Mar 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00589236
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    1. John Y. Campbell, 1993. "Understanding Risk and Return," NBER Working Papers 4554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Peter Wirtz, 2004. "«Meilleures pratiques» de gouvernance, théorie de la firme et modèles de création de valeur: Une appréciation critique des codes de bonne conduite," Working Papers CREGO 1040401, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    3. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cohen, Alma, 2005. "The costs of entrenched boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 409-433, November.
    4. Simon Johnson & Peter Boone & Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 297, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Grant Kirkpatrick, 2009. "The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2009(1), pages 61-87.
    6. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1998. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(2), pages 57-88, June.
    7. Engle, Robert F, 1982. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 987-1007, July.
    8. Howard Sherman, 2004. "Corporate Governance Ratings," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 5-7, 01.
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