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Anti-takeover Provisions as a Source of Innovation and Value Creation

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  • Humphery-Jenner, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy shareholder wealth. A key source of risk is the threat of an opportunistic takeover designed to take advantage of depressed market prices. This is especially the case in innovative or hard-to-value (`HtV') companies whose price may be depressed due to valuation difficulties rather than managerial under-performance. For these HtV firms, the threat of an opportunistic takeover can destroy value by inducing agency con icts of managerial risk aversion. managers and regulators argue that ATPs can ameliorate this problem. This article presents a theoretical model and empirical results that show that for HtV firms, ATPs encourage managers to make value-creating takeovers and increase innovation and do not induce agency con icts of managerial entrenchment. This implies that for innovative or hard-to-value firms, ATPs can ameliorate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-creation.

Suggested Citation

  • Humphery-Jenner, M., 2011. "Anti-takeover Provisions as a Source of Innovation and Value Creation," Discussion Paper 2011-045, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:9eb6f6bf-8859-429e-a029-aeb784899c32
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1327314/2011-045.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Humphery-Jenner, M., 2011. "Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions," Discussion Paper 2011-044, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Takeovers; Acquisitions; Valuation; Governance; Managerial; Risk Aversion; Innovation;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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