IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/psewpa/halshs-04788058.html

Workers as Partners: a Theory of Responsible Firms in Labor Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Del Prato

    (Aarhus University [Aarhus])

  • Marc Fleurbaey

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

We study responsible firms that internalize incumbent-worker surplus in frictional labor markets. In a firm-level benchmark, responsibility creates an endogenous wedge in the effective marginal cost of labor—akin to a hiring subsidy in the firm's first-order conditions—so it changes wage and vacancy incentives rather than only redistributing rents. The wedge is largest when outside options are weak and separations are rare, implying larger responsible wage premia in low-mobility environments and pointing to a countercyclical role for responsible wage setting. In a wage-posting model with on-the-job search, responsible firms occupy the upper tail of thewage distribution and can generate a segmented high-wage sector. In a DMP model with bargaining and endogenous tightness, responsible governance raises the value of unemployment and spills over to wages at profit-maximizing firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Del Prato & Marc Fleurbaey, 2026. "Workers as Partners: a Theory of Responsible Firms in Labor Markets," PSE Working Papers halshs-04788058, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04788058
    DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2411.05567
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04788058v2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04788058v2/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.48550/arXiv.2411.05567?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marc Fleurbaey & Grégory Ponthière, 2023. "The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2556-2594.
    2. Caroline Flammer, 2015. "Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior Financial Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(11), pages 2549-2568, November.
    3. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nyborg, Karine, 2008. "Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 509-526, December.
    4. Baron, David P., 2008. "Managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 268-288, February.
    5. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-690, September.
    6. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2010. "Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(305), pages 1-19, January.
    7. Marcus Hagedorn & Iourii Manovskii, 2008. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1692-1706, September.
    8. Frank de Bakker & Dirk Matten & Laura Spence & Christopher Wickert, 2020. "The Elephant in the Room: The Nascent Research Agenda on Corporations, Social Responsibility, and Capitalism," Post-Print hal-02992710, HAL.
    9. Edmans, Alex, 2011. "Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 621-640, September.
    10. Hänsel, Matthias, 2024. "Solving the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model: A hybrid perturbation approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    11. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-273, May.
    12. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2017. "Profit with Purpose? A Theory of Social Enterprise," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 19-58, August.
    13. Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, 2012. "Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 51-84, March.
    14. Lisa Planer-Friedrich & Marco Sahm, 2020. "Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 79-101, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francesco Del Prato & Marc Fleurbaey, 2024. "Workers as Partners: a Theory of Responsible Firms in Labor Markets," Papers 2411.05567, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    2. Banerjee, Shantanu & Homroy, Swarnodeep & Slechten, Aurélie, 2022. "Stakeholder preference and strategic corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    3. Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, 2017. "On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(2), pages 853-910, April.
    4. Liu, Xianda & Hou, Wenxuan & Main, Brian G.M., 2022. "Anti-market sentiment and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from anti-Jewish pogroms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    5. Gillan, Stuart L. & Koch, Andrew & Starks, Laura T., 2021. "Firms and social responsibility: A review of ESG and CSR research in corporate finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    6. Lisa Planer-Friedrich & Marco Sahm, 2021. "Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 33-42, March.
    7. Liu, Xianda & An, Jiafu & Duan, Tinghua & Hou, Wenxuan & Zhao, Ruoran, 2023. "Lawyers in the boardroom and firms’ environmental performance," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    8. Yanbing Wang & Michael S. Delgado & Jin Xu, 2023. "When and where does it pay to be green? – A look into socially responsible investing and the cost of equity capital," International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, December.
    9. Christian Gollier & Sébastien Pouget, 2022. "Investment Strategies and Corporate Behaviour with Socially Responsible Investors: A Theory of Active Ownership," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 997-1023, October.
    10. Erwin Eding & Bert Scholtens, 2017. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Proposals," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(6), pages 648-660, November.
    11. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho & Park, Chul-Hi, 2024. "Merger incentive and strategic corporate social responsibility by a multiproduct corporation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 193-206.
    12. Dai, Rui & Liang, Hao & Ng, Lilian, 2021. "Socially responsible corporate customers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 598-626.
    13. Karl V. Lins & Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, 2017. "Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(4), pages 1785-1824, August.
    14. Shackleton, Mark & Yan, Jiali & Yao, Yaqiong, 2022. "What drives a firm's ES performance? Evidence from stock returns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    15. Hannes Koppel & Tobias Regner, 2014. "Corporate Social Responsibility in the work place," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 347-370, September.
    16. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2020. "Merger incentive and strategic CSR by a multiproduct corporation," MPRA Paper 98830, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Fiordelisi, Franco & Galloppo, Giuseppe & Lattanzio, Gabriele & Paimanova, Viktoriia, 2023. "Looking at socially responsible investment strategies through the lenses of the global ETF industry," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    18. Mauricio G. Villena & María José Quinteros, 2024. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Environmental Emissions and Time-Consistent Taxation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(1), pages 219-255, January.
    19. Shirasu, Yoko & Kawakita, Hidetaka, 2021. "Long-term financial performance of corporate social responsibility," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    20. Lisa Planer-Friedrich & Marco Sahm, 2020. "Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 79-101, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04788058. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.