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Coordination through De Bruijn sequences

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Gossner

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Penelope Hernandez

    (Departmento Fundamentos del Análisis Económico - Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

Let (xt) be an n-periodic sequence in which the first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to some rational distribution. We prove there exists a constant C such that whenever mlnm⩾Cn, with probability close to 1, there exists an automaton of size m that matches the sequence at almost all stages.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez, 2006. "Coordination through De Bruijn sequences," Post-Print halshs-00754177, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754177
    DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2005.01.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. GOSSNER, Olivier & HERNANDEZ, Pénélope, 2001. "On the complexity of coordination," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6127 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
    3. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
    4. Jérôme Renault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 873-889, November.

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