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Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies

Author

Listed:
  • Léo Fitouchi

    (Unknown)

  • Manvir Singh

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse)

Abstract

Fines, corporal punishments, and other procedures of punitive justice recur across small-scale societies. Although they are often assumed to enforce group norms, we here propose the relation-restoration hypothesis of punitive justice, according to which punitive procedures function to restore dyadic cooperation and curtail conflict between offender and victim following violations of reciprocal obligations. We test this hypothesis's predictions using observations of justice systems in three small-scale societies. We code ethnographic reports of 97 transgressions among Kiowa equestrian foragers (North America); analyze a sample of 302 transgressions among Mentawai horticulturalists (Indonesia); and review retributive procedures documented among Nuer pastoralists (South Sudan). Consistent with the relation-restoration hypothesis, we find that third-party punishment is rare; that most third-party involvement aims at resolving conflicts; that costs paid by offenders serve to achieve forgiveness by repairing victims; that punitive justice is accompanied by ceremonial procedures aimed at limiting conflict and restoring goodwill; and that failures to impose costs contribute to a decline in reciprocal cooperation. Although we document rare instances of third-party punishment among the Kiowa (6.6% of offenses), punitive justice more often serves as restorative justice, appeasing victims' urge for revenge while not overly harming offenders' interests to ensure reconciliation.

Suggested Citation

  • Léo Fitouchi & Manvir Singh, 2023. "Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies," Post-Print hal-04402988, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04402988
    DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.03.001
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04402988v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Max M Krasnow & Leda Cosmides & Eric J Pedersen & John Tooby, 2012. "What Are Punishment and Reputation for?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(9), pages 1-9, September.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Nicolas Baumard, 2010. "Has punishment played a role in the evolution of cooperation? A critical review," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 171-192, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Molho, Catherine & Peña, Jorge & Singh, Manvir & Derex, Maxime, 2024. "Do institutions evolve like material technologies?," TSE Working Papers 24-1543, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Vallstrom, Daniel, 2025. "Cooperative Evolutionary Pressure and Diminishing Returns Might Explain the Fermi Paradox: On What Super-AIs Are Like," OSF Preprints bq438_v3, Center for Open Science.

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