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The politician and the vote factory: Candidates’ resource management skills and electoral returns

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne Farvaque

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Martial Foucault

    (Political Science Department - Political Science Department - UdeM - Université de Montréal)

  • Stephane Vigeant

    (Institut des sciences economiques et de management - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies, LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper disentangles resource management skills of candidates from the electoral circumstances that help them getting (re-)elected. It is first made use of the DEA method to measure candidates' resource management abilities. Second, determinants of these scores are estimated. The paper uses a database detailing the different sources of campaign funding for French members of Parliament to analyze their relative performance. Results show a large variance in campaign resource management ability, particularly between political parties, and incumbents and newcomers. They also reveal an important role of constituencies' characteristics and of politicians' experience in explaining differences between politicians' efforts. Thus, public policies could promote virtuous regulations to reduce disparities among candidates with different financial backgrounds and access to resources, to foster a fairer democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Farvaque & Martial Foucault & Stephane Vigeant, 2019. "The politician and the vote factory: Candidates’ resource management skills and electoral returns," Post-Print hal-02497986, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02497986
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.09.007
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Abel François & Michael Visser & Lionel Wilner, 2022. "The petit effect of campaign spending on votes: using political financing reforms to measure spending impacts in multiparty elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 29-57, July.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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