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Responsabilité sociale d'une entreprise publique : une formalisation du jeu des acteurs

  • Myriam Donsimoni


    (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - CNRS - Grenoble 2 UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier)

  • Daniel Labaronne

    (Larefi - Laboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux 4)

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    We study the behavior of managers of a public company, the Chérifien Phosphates Office, and local officials engaged in a relationship of CSR. What are the theoretical foundations of this relationship and the strategies of these actors? We formalize, from game theory, the influence of managers of the OCP on the action of elected officials. This influence is exercised either by cooperation or by the control. It can lead to information asymmetry generated by politicians. We examine the attitude of managers OCP facing this biased situation to draw managerial lessons.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00972649.

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    Date of creation: 2014
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Management International Review, Management International Review, 2014, Volume 18 (Numéro 2), pp.Pages 22-38
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00972649
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    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2010. "Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(305), pages 1-19, 01.
    3. Daniel Labaronne & Fahmi Ben-Abdelkader, 2008. "Transition institutionnelle des pays méditerranéens et des pays d'Europe de l'Est. Analyse comparative de l'évolution de leurs systèmes de gouvernance," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(5), pages 743-776.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "Le rôle de la confiance dans le système de gouvernance des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0980501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1379 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Fabienne Boudier & Faouzi Bensebaa, 2008. "Responsabilité sociale des firmes multinationales : faut-il être propriétaire pour être responsable ?," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 27-44.
    7. Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
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