Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool
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- Louis Lévy-Garboua & Claude Montmarquette & Jonathan Vaksmann & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 198-218, February.
- Louis Lévy-Garboua & Claude Montmarquette & Jonathan Vaksmann & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool," Working Papers 1535, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Louis Lévy-Garboua & Claude Montmarquette & Jonathan Vaksmann & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool," Working Papers halshs-01243256, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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