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Anthropology and Economics: The Argument for a Microeconomic Anthropology

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  • Jérôme Ballet

Abstract

The rapprochement between anthropology and economics is not a new subject of debate. Economic anthropology, whose very survival has largely been attributed to Marxism, remains a minor field of interest within anthropology and perhaps even more so within economics. Over recent years, researchers have argued that anthropology and economics should be interwoven, but few conceptual and empirical analyses have taken up the cause. The aim of this article is to promote a microeconomic anthropology. We discuss a contextual methodology and illustrate its advantages by way of interpersonal transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Ballet, 2018. "Anthropology and Economics: The Argument for a Microeconomic Anthropology," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2018-14, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
  • Handle: RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2018-14
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    File URL: http://cahiersdugretha.u-bordeaux.fr/2018/2018-14.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transfers; Contextualism; Rights and Obligations; Social Anthropology;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology

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