Absorbing Shocks: National Rainy-Day Funds and Cross-Country Transfers in Fiscal Union
In this paper we investigate the interplay between national rainy-day funds and supra-national transfers in a fiscal union. Given that the EU has established rules limiting deficits, national rainy-day funds could in theory provide a way for countries to obey the rules and use fiscal policy, yet avoid using austerity measures during a recession. The rainy-day fund is self-insurance and we examine the funding of a national rainy-day fund for a country in isolation. We then introduce a fiscal union while allowing member countries to retain some fiscal policy control. We find that moral hazard leads to lower contributions to a rainy day fund with a fiscal union present, and further that the higher the fiscal transfer, the lower will be the contributions to the rainy-day fund. The optimal size of the fiscal union trades-off the ex-post insurance provided by the union and the moral hazard which reduces national ex-ante preparation for stabilization policies. Optimally, the insurance provided by the fiscal union should be lower (1) the more effective is own-fiscal policy; (2) the more the presence of the fiscal union reduces rainy-day fund savings; (3) the lower is the relative probability of recession; and (4) the lower is the utility gain of redistribution in the union. We also find that commitment to a transfer policy is essential. A fiscal union that is prone to break the rules on transfers negatively impacts the ex-ante contributions to individual members’ rainy day funds.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2016|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Campus Universitario As Lagoas s/n , 32004 Ourense|
Phone: (+34) 988 368 725
Web page: http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Petros Varthalitis, 2016.
"Monetary Union, Even Higher Integration, or Back to National Currencies?,"
CESifo Economic Studies,
CESifo, vol. 62(2), pages 232-255.
- George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Petros Varthalitis, 2016. "Monetary Union, Even Higher Integration, or Back to National Currencies?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5762, CESifo Group Munich.
- Davide Furceri & Aleksandra Zdzienicka, 2015. "The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 683-710, September.
- Davide Furceri & Aleksandra Zdzienicka, 2013. "The Euro Area Crisis; Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism?," IMF Working Papers 13/198, International Monetary Fund.
- Bent E. Sï¿½rensen & Oved Yosha, 1998. "International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 327, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Evers, Michael P., 2015. "Fiscal federalism and monetary unions: A quantitative assessment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 59-75.
- Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung & Agnieszka Markiewicz, 2013. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 59(3), pages 449-488, September.
- Michael D. Bordo & Agnieszka Markiewicz & Lars Jonung, 2011. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History," NBER Working Papers 17380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sorensen, Bent E. & Yosha, Oved, 1998. "International risk sharing and European monetary unification," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 211-238, August.
- Sorensen, B-E & Yosha, O, 1996. "International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification," Papers 40-96, Tel Aviv.
- Bent E. Sørensen & Oved Yosha, 1996. "International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification," Working Papers 1996-30, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Afonso, António & Furceri, Davide, 2008. "EMU enlargement, stabilization costs and insurance mechanisms," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 169-187, March.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
- Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It work? And Are There Really 'No Alternatives'?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(1), pages 03-09, 04.
- Fuest, Clemens & Peichl, Andreas, 2012. "European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It Work? And Are There Really 'No Alternatives'?," IZA Policy Papers 39, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Zhao, Bo, 2014. "Saving for a rainy day: estimating the appropriate size of U.S. state budget stabilization funds," Working Papers 14-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Neumann, Dirk & Bargain, Olivier & Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Peichl, Andreas, 2012. "Fiscal Union in Europe? Efficiency, Equity and Stabilizing Effects of an EU-Wide Income Tax," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 66063, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gov:wpaper:1606. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricio Sanchez-Fernandez)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.