Corruption and financial intermediation in a panel of regions: cross-border effects of corruption
The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. In this study we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and non-monotonic forms of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our study finds a negative and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on corruption. Specifically, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial intermediation is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of the standard deviation in the corruption index and this relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, including: (i) different sets of control variables; (ii) different econometrics techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and (vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, contagion effects, of corruption.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2011|
|Date of revision:|
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