Voting over informal risk-sharing rules
People vote over risk-sharing rules to cope with random revenues. Risk-sharing rules are enforced through peer pressure : those who comply exert a negative externality on those who do not. People are differently affected by this externality. The author determines the elected risk-sharing rules and the level of compliance. It turns out that full risk-sharing is achieved only if everybody complies. Partial risk-sharing is more often achieved with, sometime, some level of non-compliance. In many cases, a majority of people votes over and complies with the risk-sharing rule that maximizes their own expected payoff.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (0033) 4 76 82 54 39
Web page: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/Email:
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abigail Barr, 2001.
"Social Dilennas and shame - based Sanctions: Experimental results from rural Zimbabwe,"
Economics Series Working Papers
WPS/2001-11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Abigail Barr, 2001. "Social dilemmas and shame-based sanctions: experimental results from rural Zimbabwe," CSAE Working Paper Series 2001-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- George A. Akerlof, 1978.
"A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence,"
Special Studies Papers
118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Agnès Vertier)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.