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Choosing Electoral rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities

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  • Philippe Aghion
  • Alberto Alesina
  • Francesco Trebbi

Abstract

This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt ”winner-take-all” citywide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model.

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  • Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2005. "Choosing Electoral rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2065, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:2065
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    1. Porten, John & Rhee, Inbok & Gibson, Clark, 2022. "Ethnicity is not public service destiny: The political logic of service distribution in South Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    2. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Hao, Yu & Xue, Melanie Meng, 2017. "Friends from afar: The Taiping Rebellion, cultural proximity and primary schooling in the Lower Yangzi, 1850–1949," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 44-69.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Francesco Trebbi, 2006. "Who Adjusts and When?The Political Economy of Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(si), pages 1-1.
    5. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 2008. "Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 426-447, April.
    6. Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, "undated". "Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks," Working Papers 2007-29, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    7. Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 399-422.
    8. Michael Storper, 2010. "Why Does a City Grow? Specialisation, Human Capital or Institutions?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(10), pages 2027-2050, September.

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