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Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance

Author

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  • Sheffrin, S.M.
  • Triest, R.K.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Sheffrin, S.M. & Triest, R.K., 1991. "Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance," Papers 373, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:caldav:373
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    Cited by:

    1. Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 213-232, February.
    2. Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2001. "Redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 51-71, July.
    3. Paulus, Alari, 2015. "Tax evasion and measurement error: An econometric analysis of survey data linked with tax records," ISER Working Paper Series 2015-10, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    4. Benno Torgler & Markus Schaffner & Alison Macintyre, 2007. "Tax Compliance, Tax Morale, and Governance Quality," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0727, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    5. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2007. "Tax evasion and social interactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2089-2112, December.
    6. Guillermo E. Perry & William F. Maloney & Omar S. Arias & Pablo Fajnzylber & Andrew D. Mason & Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007. "Informality : Exit and Exclusion," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6730, December.
    7. Lin, Chung-cheng & Yang, C.C., 2006. "Fine enough or don't fine at all," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-213, February.
    8. Bailey, Clive & Turner, John, 2001. "Strategies to Reduce Contribution Evasion in Social Security Financing," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 385-393, February.
    9. Jeffrey Cohen & Gil Manzon & Valentina Zamora, 2015. "Contextual and Individual Dimensions of Taxpayer Decision Making," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(4), pages 631-647, February.
    10. Claudio Agostini & Claudia Martinez, 2013. "Tax Credits Response to Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Chile," Working Papers wp_029, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
    11. Mendoza, Juan P. & Wielhouwer, Jacco L. & Kirchler, Erich, 2017. "The backfiring effect of auditing on tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 284-294.
    12. Roger A. McCain, 2000. "Road Rage: Imitative Learning Of Self-Destructive Behavior In An Agent-Based Simulation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 270, Society for Computational Economics.
    13. Cãƒtãƒlina Cozmei, 2012. "Playing The Fiscal Lottery Game," Proceedings of the INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 6(1), pages 511-521, November.
    14. Eide, Erling, 1998. "Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 53(3-4), pages 296-311.
    15. Joel van der Weele, 2007. "The Signalling Power of Sanctions in Collective Action Problems," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/10, European University Institute.
    16. Laura Sour, 2004. "An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(1), pages 43-61, January-J.
    17. Bohnet, Iris & Cooter, Robert, 2001. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt5h6970h8, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    18. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 2004. "Economic theory of tax compliance with special reference to tax compliance costs," Working Papers 04/13, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    19. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 2005. "Information Cascades and Observational Learning," Working Paper Series 2005-22, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    20. Richter, Wolfram F., 2007. "Geplante Steuerhinterziehung und ihre effiziente Bestrafung," RWI Materialien 37, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    21. David Auerbach & Janet Holtzblatt & Paul Jacobs & Alexandra Minicozzi, 2010. "Will Health Insurance Mandates Increase Coverage? Synthesizing Perspectives from Health, Tax, and Behavioral Economics: Working Paper 2010-05," Working Papers 21600, Congressional Budget Office.
    22. Forest, Adam & Kirchler, Erich, 2010. "Targeting occupations with varying reputations to increase tax revenue," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 400-406, June.
    23. Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van der Weele, 2009. "Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment," Economics Working Papers 1150, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    24. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June.
    25. Torgler, Benno, 2011. "Tax morale and compliance : review of evidence and case studies for Europe," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5922, The World Bank.

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