Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility
In this paper the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) is substituted for the theory of expected utility (EU) in a model of optimal provision of public goods. The substitution generalizes the Samuelson rule, previously modified to include deadweight loss and tax evasion loss.
|Date of creation:||12 Oct 2002|
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