Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention
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- Lars Gårn Hansen & Frank Jensen & Eirik S. Amundsen, 2014. "Regulating Groundwater Use in Developing Countries: A Feasible Instrument for Public Intervention," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 317-335, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsDeveloping countries; groundwater use; moral hazard problems; taxes;
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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