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Benefits from Groundwater Management: Magnitude, Sensitivity, and Distribution

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  • Feinerman, Eli
  • Knapp, Keith C.

Abstract

Empirical estimates of benefits from groundwater management are reported for an area in California with heavy reliance on groundwater supplies. Benefits are quite sensitive to the water demand schedule and interest rate but less sensitive to other parameters. I However,i n all cases considered the increases in welfare from groundwater management are less than ten percent. Tax revenues received under a system of pump taxes are four to five times as large as the benefits from management. Thus, groundwater users gain under a system of quotas but may suffer substantial welfare losses under pump taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Feinerman, Eli & Knapp, Keith C., 1983. "Benefits from Groundwater Management: Magnitude, Sensitivity, and Distribution," 1983 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 3, West Lafayette, Indiana 279116, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea83:279116
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.279116
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oscar R. Burt, 1964. "Optimal Resource Use Over Time with an Application to Ground Water," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 80-93, September.
    2. Brown, Gardner, Jr, 1974. "An Optimal Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 163-173, Jan.-Feb..
    3. Edward F. Renshaw, 1963. "The Management of Ground Water Reservoirs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 45(2), pages 285-295.
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