Polarized Contributions but Convergent Agendas
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DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2022.29
Note: the paper SUPERCEDES WP 18-01, "Greed as a Source of Polarization"
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More about this item
Keywords
Polarization; Campaign Contributions; Agendas;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2023-05-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2023-05-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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