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The conduct of monetary policy with a shrinking stock of government debt

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Abstract

In many countries, government-budget surpluses have led to a decline in the amount of federal government debt outstanding. This paper considers the consequences of this development for a central bank that conducts monetary policy through open market operations in treasury debt. A model is presented in which a treasury taxes, spends, and issues debt; a central bank conducts monetary policy through open market operations; and banks are intermediaries for all private savings. The model suggests potentially severe consequences from a shrinking stock of government debt in the absence of a change in the conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate cannot be below their seigniorage-maximizing levels. In effect, a small stock of debt combined with restrictions on a central bank?s portfolio can put the economy on the Pareto inferior side of the seigniorage Laffer curve, with an unnecessarily high inflation rate and nominal interest rate. Moreover, if the government also runs a primary budget deficit, equilibrium can fail to exist. The model presented can yield estimates of how much debt must be outstanding to avoid each situation. Discount-window lending is a feasible?and desirable? alternative method for conducting monetary policy. It relaxes any restrictions on the attainable set of interest rates and inflation rates implied by a decline in the stock of government debt outstanding. Unless the economy is on the Pareto inferior side of the Laffer curve, welfare is higher when discount-window loans are made at market-determined interest rates.

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  • Stacey L. Schreft & Bruce Smith, 2001. "The conduct of monetary policy with a shrinking stock of government debt," Research Working Paper RWP 01-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedkrw:rwp01-09
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    Cited by:

    1. Eisei Ohtaki, 2013. "Asymmetric Liquidity Shocks and Optimality of the Freidman Rule," Working Papers e058, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    2. Edda Claus & Mardi Dungey & Renée Fry, 2008. "Monetary Policy in Illiquid Markets: Options for a Small Open Economy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 305-336, July.
    3. Huber, Samuel & Kim, Jaehong, 2020. "An overlapping generations model for monetary policy analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    4. Juan Carlos Medina Guirado, 2020. "Unconventional monetary policy and credit market activity," Estudios Regionales en Economía, Población y Desarrollo. Cuadernos de Trabajo de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez. 57, Cuerpo Académico 41 de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, revised 04 Jan 2020.
    5. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2005. "Heterogeneity, Redistribution, And The Friedman Rule," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 437-454, May.
    6. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Keister, Todd, 2006. "Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, And Indeterminacy Of Equilibrium," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
    7. Machicado, Carlos Gustavo, 2008. "Liquidity shocks and the dollarization of a banking system," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 369-381, March.
    8. Rangan Gupta, 2005. "Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(2), pages 263-288, November.
    9. Lukas Altermatt & Christian Wipf, 2024. "Liquidity, the Mundell–Tobin Effect, and the Friedman Rule," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(5), pages 1235-1259, August.
    10. Tetsuo Ono, 2020. "Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 190-219, February.
    11. Jung, Kuk Mo, 2018. "Uncertainty-induced dynamic inefficiency and the optimal inflation rate," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 486-506.
    12. Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Optimality of the Friedman Rule in an Overlapping Generations Model with Spatial Separation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(7), pages 1741-1758, October.
    13. Carlos Gustavo Machicado, 2007. "Growth and Banking Structure in a Partially Dollarized Economy," Development Research Working Paper Series 02/2007, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
    14. Stacey Schreft & Bruce Smith, 2008. "The social value of risk-free government debt," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 131-155, March.
    15. Eisei Ohtaki, 2016. "Optimality of the Friedman rule under ambiguity," Working Papers e103, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    16. Eisei Ohtaki, 2023. "Climate change, financial intermediation, and monetary policy," Working Papers e179, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    17. Eisei Ohtaki, 2014. "Asymmetric liquidity shocks and optimal monetary policy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1068-1080.
    18. Joseph Haslag & Chao Gu, 2012. "Unconventional Optimal Repurchase Agreements," 2012 Meeting Papers 431, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Chao Gu & Joseph Haslag, 2014. "Unconventional Optimal Open Market Purchases," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(3), pages 543-558, July.
    20. repec:cuf:journl:y:2013:v:14:i:3:paal is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Chao Gu & Joseph Haslag, 2011. "Endogenous Credit Cycles," Working Papers 1114, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.

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