IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgfe/2015-73.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

End of the Line: Behavior of HELOC Borrowers Facing Payment Changes

Author

Abstract

An important question in the household finance literature is whether a change in required debt payments affects borrower behavior. One challenge in this literature has been identifying whether higher default rates observed after an increase in debt payments stem from the inability of borrowers to pay the higher amount, or the attrition of better borrowers in advance of the payment change. A related question is whether the higher default rate is a result of specific features of the debt product, or the type of borrower who chooses the product. We address both of these questions as they relate to a scheduled increase in payments on home equity lines of credit (HELOCs). Many existing HELOCs are structured such that when they reach the end of the draw period, they convert from open-ended, non-amortizing lines of credit to closed-end, amortizing loans. We compare the performance of HELOCs reaching end of draw with those not reaching end of draw and find that HELOCs that reach end of draw have a significantly higher cumulative default rate in the following months. We also show that, at end of draw, borrowers who have a HELOC with a balloon feature are more likely to have lower credit scores and higher LTVs than borrowers who have HELOCs with longer amortization periods. However, even controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, HELOCs with a balloon payment are more likely to default. This result provides evidence that HELOC defaults can be influenced both by the features of the product and the characteristics of borrowers who choose those features.

Suggested Citation

  • Kathleen W. Johnson & Robert F. Sarama, 2015. "End of the Line: Behavior of HELOC Borrowers Facing Payment Changes," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-73, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2015-73
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2015.073
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015073pap.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.073
    File Function: http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.073
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.17016/FEDS.2015.073?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tracy, Joseph & Wright, Joshua, 2016. "Payment changes and default risk: The impact of refinancing on expected credit losses," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 60-70.
    2. Mark J. Garmaise, 2013. "The Attractions and Perils of Flexible Mortgage Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2548-2582.
    3. John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, 2015. "A Model of Mortgage Default," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1495-1554, August.
    4. Ronel Elul & Nicholas S. Souleles & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Dennis Glennon & Robert Hunt, 2010. "What "Triggers" Mortgage Default?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 490-494, May.
    5. Yongheng Deng & John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, 2000. "Mortgage Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 275-308, March.
    6. Andreas Fuster & Paul S. Willen, 2017. "Payment Size, Negative Equity, and Mortgage Default," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 167-191, November.
    7. Brent W. Ambrose & Michael LaCour‐Little, 2001. "Prepayment Risk in Adjustable Rate Mortgages Subject to Initial Year Discounts: Some New Evidence," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(2), pages 305-327.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Epouhe, Onesime & Hall, Arden, 2016. "Payment shock in HELOCs at the end of the draw period," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 131-147.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Therese C. Scharlemann & Stephen H. Shore, 2022. "The effect of changing mortgage payments on default and prepayment: Evidence from HAMP resets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1231-1256, September.
    2. Karamon, Kadiri & McManus, Douglas & Yannopoulos, Elias, 2016. "Spillover effects of continuous forbearance mortgages," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 95-108.
    3. Stephanie Moulton & Yung Chun & Stephanie Casey Pierce & Roberto Quercia & Sarah Riley & Holly Holtzen, 2022. "Does Temporary Mortgage Assistance for Unemployed Homeowners Reduce Longer‐Term Mortgage Default? An Analysis of the Hardest Hit Fund Program," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(2), pages 515-551, March.
    4. Erik Hembre & Stephanie Moulton & Matthew Record, 2021. "Low‐Income Homeownership and the Role of State Subsidies: A Comparative Analysis of Mortgage Outcomes," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(1), pages 78-106, January.
    5. Matteo Benetton, 2021. "Leverage Regulation and Market Structure: A Structural Model of the U.K. Mortgage Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 2997-3053, December.
    6. Gene Amromin & Jennifer Huang & Clemens Sialm & Edward Zhong, 2018. "Complex Mortgages [Why don’t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures, and securitization]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(6), pages 1975-2007.
    7. Min Qi & Harald Scheule & Yan Zhang, 2021. "Positive Payment Shocks, Liquidity and Refinance Constraints and Default Risk of Home Equity Lines of Credit at End of Draw," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 423-454, April.
    8. Steven Laufer, 2018. "Equity Extraction and Mortgage Default," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 1-33, April.
    9. O’Toole, Conor & Slaymaker, Rachel, 2021. "Repayment capacity, debt service ratios and mortgage default: An exploration in crisis and non-crisis periods," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    10. Yusuf VARLI & Gökhan ÖVENÇ, 2019. "Dynamic Analysis of Defaults and Prepayments in the Turkish Mortgage Market," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 27(39).
    11. Slaymaker, Rachel & O'Toole, Conor & McQuinn, Kieran & Fahy, Mike, 2018. "Monetary policy normalisation and mortgage arrears in a recovering economy: The case of the Irish residential market," Papers WP613, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    12. Richard Chamboko & Jorge Miguel Bravo, 2020. "A Multi-State Approach to Modelling Intermediate Events and Multiple Mortgage Loan Outcomes," Risks, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-29, June.
    13. Alin Marius Andries & Anca Copaciu & Radu Popa & Razvan Vlahu, 2021. "Recourse and (strategic) mortgage defaults: Evidence from changes in housing market laws," Working Papers 727, DNB.
    14. Dendramis, Y. & Tzavalis, E. & Adraktas, G., 2018. "Credit risk modelling under recessionary and financially distressed conditions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 160-175.
    15. Therese C. Scharlemann & Stephen H. Shore, 2015. "The Effect of Negative Equity on Mortgage Default: Evidence from HAMP PRA," Working Papers 15-06, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    16. Nadav Ben Zeev, 2019. "Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, Systematic Monetary Policy, And The Root Cause Of The Financial Crisis," Working Papers 1908, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    17. Kadiri Karamon & Douglas McManus & Jun Zhu, 2017. "Refinance and Mortgage Default: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of HARP’s Impact on Default Rates," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 457-475, November.
    18. Kyle Herkenhoff & Lee Ohanian, 2019. "The Impact of Foreclosure Delay on U.S. Employment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 63-83, January.
    19. Stefano Colonnello & Mariela Dal Borgo, 2024. "Raising Household Leverage: Evidence from Co-Financed Mortgages," Working Papers 2024: 01, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    20. Anil Kumar, 2018. "Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas Border," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 268-297, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    HELOC; consumer credit; end of draw; home equity; payment changes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2015-73. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.