IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v100y2010i2p490-94.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

What "Triggers" Mortgage Default?

Author

Listed:
  • Ronel Elul
  • Nicholas S. Souleles
  • Souphala Chomsisengphet
  • Dennis Glennon
  • Robert Hunt

Abstract

This paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default: negative equity and illiquidity. To do so, the authors combine loan-level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower's broader balance sheet. This gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers: those with high credit card utilization rates. The authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default, with comparably sized marginal effects. Moreover, these two factors interact with each other: The effect of illiquidity on default generally increases with high combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTV), though it is significant even for low CLTV. County-level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk (though less so than high utilization) and strongly interact with CLTV. In addition, having a second mortgage implies significantly higher default risk, particularly for borrowers who have a first-mortgage LTV approaching 100 percent.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ronel Elul & Nicholas S. Souleles & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Dennis Glennon & Robert Hunt, 2010. "What "Triggers" Mortgage Default?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 490-494, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:2:p:490-94
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.490
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.2.490
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ethan Cohen-Cole & Jonathan Morse, 2009. "Your house or your credit card, which would you choose?: personal delinquency tradeoffs and precautionary liquidity motives," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers QAU09-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    2. Kau James B. & Keenan Donald C. & Kim Taewon, 1994. "Default Probabilities for Mortgages," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 278-296, May.
    3. Neil Bhutta & Jane K. Dokko & Hui Shan, 2010. "The depth of negative equity and mortgage default decisions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2010-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. David B. Gross, 2002. "An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(1), pages 319-347, March.
    5. Kristopher Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, 2007. "Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures," Working Papers 07-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    6. Sumit Agarwal & Chunlin Liu & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2007. "The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates-Evidence from Consumer Credit Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 986-1019, December.
    7. Patrick Bajari & Chenghuan Sean Chu & Minjung Park, 2008. "An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default From 2000 to 2007," NBER Working Papers 14625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guiso, Luigi & Sodini, Paolo, 2013. "Household Finance: An Emerging Field," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1397-1532, Elsevier.
    2. Thomas Schelkle, 2018. "Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(6), pages 1101-1137, September.
    3. repec:fip:fedreq:y:2012:i:2q:p:111-138:n:vol.98no.2 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Breck L. Robinson, 2012. "The performance of non-owner-occupied mortgages during the housing crisis," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 98(2Q), pages 111-138.
    5. Steven Laufer, 2018. "Equity Extraction and Mortgage Default," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 1-33, April.
    6. Diego Avanzini & Juan Francisco Martínez & Víctor Pérez, 2016. "A micro-powered model of mortgage default risk for full recourse economies, with an application to the case of Chile," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Combining micro and macro data for financial stability analysis, volume 41, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Khandani, Amir E. & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C., 2013. "Systemic risk and the refinancing ratchet effect," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 29-45.
    8. Kanis Saengchote & Krislert Samphantharak, 2020. "Delinquency Priority in Consumer Credit: Evidence from Thai Microdata," PIER Discussion Papers 135, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    9. João Rebelo & José Vaz Caldas, 2010. "Default Mortgage Profile: A Micro Analysis Of The Portuguese Case," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 109-125.
    10. Kenneth P. Brevoort & Cheryl R. Cooper, 2013. "Foreclosure's Wake: The Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 747-792, December.
    11. Dendramis, Y. & Tzavalis, E. & Adraktas, G., 2018. "Credit risk modelling under recessionary and financially distressed conditions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 160-175.
    12. Anil Kumar, 2018. "Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas Border," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 268-297, February.
    13. John Geanakoplos & William Zame, 2014. "Collateral equilibrium, I: a basic framework," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 443-492, August.
    14. Modestino, Alicia Sasser & Dennett, Julia, 2013. "Are American homeowners locked into their houses? The impact of housing market conditions on state-to-state migration," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 322-337.
    15. Guiso, Luigi & Zingales, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola, 2009. "Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages," CEPR Discussion Papers 7352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Reamonn Lyndon & Yvonne McCarthy, 2013. "What Lies Beneath? Understanding Recent Trends in Irish Mortgage Arrears," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 44(1), pages 117-150.
    17. Shuang Zhu & R. Pace & Walter Morales, 2014. "Using Housing Futures in Mortgage Research," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 1-15, January.
    18. John P. Harding & Jing Li & Stuart S. Rosenthal & Xirui Zhang, 2022. "Forced moves and home maintenance: The amplifying effects of mortgage payment burden on underwater homeowners," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(2), pages 498-533, June.
    19. Gyourko, Joseph & Tracy, Joseph, 2014. "Reconciling theory and empirics on the role of unemployment in mortgage default," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 87-96.
    20. John Y. Campbell, 2013. "Mortgage Market Design," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:2:p:490-94. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.