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Timeless perspective policymaking: When is discretion superior?

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  • Richard Dennis

Abstract

In this paper I show that discretionary policymaking can be superior to timeless perspective policymaking and identify model features that make this outcome more likely. Developing a measure of conditional loss that treats the auxiliary state variables that characterize the timeless perspective equilibrium appropriately, I use a New Keynesian DSGE model to show that discretion can dominate timeless perspective policymaking when the Phillips curve is relatively flat, due, perhaps, to firm-specific capital (or labor) and/or Kimball (1995) aggregation in combination with nominal price rigidity. These results suggest that studies applying the timeless perspective might also usefully compare its performance to discretion, paying careful attention to how policy performance is evaluated.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Dennis, 2008. "Timeless perspective policymaking: When is discretion superior?," Working Paper Series 2008-21, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2008-21
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlsson, Mikael & Westermark, Andreas, 2011. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 579-603, April.
    2. Juan Paez-Farrell, 2009. "Timeless perspective vs discretionary policymaking when the degree of inflation persistence is unknown," Discussion Paper Series 2009_14, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Sep 2009.
    3. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2010. "Inflation Targeting," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1237-1302, Elsevier.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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