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Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs

  • William P. Osterberg
  • James B. Thomson

An examination of the empirical impact of depositor preference legislation (DPL) on resolution type and resolution costs for commercial banks. It focuses on the impact of state DPL statutes, using FDIC and call-report data on resolution costs and types for all operating FDIC-BIF insured commercial banks that closed or required FDIC financial assistance from January 1986 through December 1992.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 9715.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9715
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  1. Robert B. Avery & Allen N. Berger, 1989. "Loan commitments and bank risk exposure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 65, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-64, July.
  3. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 1985. "Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 3(4), pages 370-79, October.
  4. Kane, Edward J., 1986. "Appearance and reality in deposit insurance: The case for reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 175-188, June.
  5. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Depositor preference and the cost of capital for insured depository institutions," Working Paper 9404, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  6. Walker F. Todd & James B. Thomson, 1990. "An insider's view of the political economy of the too big to fail doctrine," Working Paper 9017, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  7. G. D. Koppenhaver & Roger D. Stover, 1991. "Standby letters of credit and bank capital: evidence of market disciplines," Proceedings 326, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  8. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs," Working Paper 9403, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Barth, James R & Bartholomew, Philip F & Bradley, Michael, 1990. " Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 731-54, July.
  10. James B. Thomson, 1994. "The national depositor preference law," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb.
  11. Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
  12. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1991. "Off-balance sheet liabilities, deposit insurance and capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 825-846, September.
  13. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
  14. William P. Osterberg, 1996. "The impact of depositor preference laws," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-11.
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