Depositor-preference laws and the cost of debt capital
Under depositor-preference laws, depositors' claims on the assets of failed depository institutions are senior to unsecured general-creditor claims. As a result, depositor preference changes the capital structure of banks and thrifts, thereby affecting the cost of capital for depositories. Depositor preference has no impact on the total value of banks and thrifts, however, unless deposit insurance is mispriced.
Volume (Year): (1999)
Issue (Month): Q III ()
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- Chen, Andrew H, 1978. "Recent Developments in the Cost of Debt Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(3), pages 863-77, June.
- William P. Osterberg, 1996. "The impact of depositor preference laws," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-11.
- Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
- Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, June.
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