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Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs

  • William P. Osterberg
  • James B. Thomson

An examination of the empirical impact of depositor preference legislation (DPL) on resolution type and resolution costs for commercial banks. It focuses on the impact of state DPL statutes, using FDIC and call-report data on resolution costs and types for all operating FDIC-BIF insured commercial banks that closed or required FDIC financial assistance from January 1986 through December 1992.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Proceedings with number 591.

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Length: 226-246
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (1998 : 34th) ; Payments systems in the global economy : risks and opportunitie.
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:591
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  1. Robert B. Avery & Allen N. Berger, 1990. "Loan commitments and bank risk exposure," Working Paper 9015, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Depositor preference and the cost of capital for insured depository institutions," Working Paper 9404, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  3. Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-64, July.
  4. James B. Thomson, 1994. "The national depositor preference law," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb.
  5. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 1985. "Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 3(4), pages 370-79, October.
  6. Barth, James R & Bartholomew, Philip F & Bradley, Michael, 1990. " Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 731-54, July.
  7. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1991. "Off-balance sheet liabilities, deposit insurance and capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 825-846, September.
  8. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1994. "Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs," Working Paper 9403, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
  10. Kane, Edward J., 1986. "Appearance and reality in deposit insurance: The case for reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 175-188, June.
  11. William P. Osterberg, 1996. "The impact of depositor preference laws," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-11.
  12. Walker F. Todd & James B. Thomson, 1990. "An insider's view of the political economy of the too big to fail doctrine," Working Paper 9017, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  13. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
  14. G. D. Koppenhaver & Roger D. Stover, 1991. "Standby letters of credit and bank capital: evidence of market disciplines," Proceedings 326, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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